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The Regional Implications
Roderic Alley
In this paper I shall analyze the regional impact of the military coups that
occurred in Fiji during 1987. As if not significant enough in themselves,
these events occurred in the country that, given its relative size, central
location, and previous role in fostering regional cooperation, remained a
critical focus for the South Pacific. Because of the prominence of Australia
and New Zealand as actors in the region, I shall devote considerable
attention to how governments in those countries reacted, how their
involvement in the region influenced the accommodations they developed
with the postcoup regime, and the extent to which wider international
implications played a part in shaping the adjustments that Colonel Sitiveni
Rabuka's coups forced on the Pacific Islands.
By any reckoning, these remarkable events were as untoward as they
were unforeseen. In the relatively untroubled politics of the postindepen-
dence Pacific, governments were as unprepared nationally as they were
regionally to manage a coherent response to the new order in Fiji. One
dilemma more acute for some than for others involved a reconciliation of
internationally respectable positions on support for human rights and
peaceful constitutional change in Fiji with avoidance of charges of unwar-
ranted interference in the internal affairs of another regional state.
From an empirical perspective, one challenge is to determine how and
why contrasting regional actors responded to the coups and whether, if at
all, they modified Pacific regional policies accordingly. A further challenge
is to ascertain the impact of the military coups on the fabric of regional
cooperation in the Pacific-whether from the perspective of the manage-
ment of the relevant agencies concerned, or the less tangible but no less
significant considerations of the working morale ::J,mong officials still
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headquartered in the capital of the country where the region's first mili-
tary coup was staged.
Added to these empirical and policy considerations is the question of
what the coups in Fiji revealed about the region's international relations.
That includes not only political cooperation within the Pacific region, or
significant questions about how Australia and New Zealand handled the
issue through their external relations, but the wider international implica-
tions for the Commonwealth, the United Nations, and the interests of.
such actors as France and the United States.
THE FIRST MILITARY Coup
When the first military coup was staged by Colonel Rabuka in May 1987,
the regional political climate was more than usually tense following wide,
if unsatisfactorily substantiated, allegations about Libyan involvement in
Vanuatu. The allegations were regarded as sufficiently serious to warrant
a hasty visit to New Zealand by the then Australian Foreign Minister Bill
Hayden, who briefed New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange early in
May about assumed Libyan involvement in the South Pacific. This epi-
sode was all the more puzzling in that until then the two men had not met
officially in New Zealand. More widely, there was considerable if often
confused debate as to whether "the security" of the Pacific Islands was
under threat from growing Soviet intentions through commercial fishing
arrangements with such tiny states as Kiribati, apparently making the
region subject to competing superpower pressures. The atmosphere of
uncertainty encouraged member states of the South Pacific Forum to take
cautious positions on security questions.
When Colonel Rabuka staged his decisive putsch against the recently
elected coalition government of Dr Timoci Bavadra on 14 May 1987, the
people of Fiji were not alone in being taken utterly by surprise. Although
Australia, New Zealand, and the South Pacific Forum states were equally
astounded by Rabuka's audacity, the hesitancy of their responses signified
that, in an upheaval of this magnitude, the region's self-proclaimed con-
sensus about a "Pacific Way" was singularly nonexistent as a mechanism
for the management of a local political crisis. In part this could be attrib-
uted to understandable confusion about the true situation in Fiji-in par-
ticular the extent to which the governor-general, who assumed full execu-
tive authority soon after the coup, was prepared to uphold the provisions
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of the 1970 constitution. Just as significant was an intuitive recoil by most
governments in the region from anything that could be construed as
unwarranted interference in Fiji's internal affairs. In addition there was a
reluctance, once the coup had occurred, for island governments to be seen
to acknowledge either their need for information from Australia or New
Zealand about what was really happening in Fiji, or especially how they
should respond to it. For some Pacific Island governments at least, the
confusions that followed the first coup were more than a little convenient
as justification for delay or unwillingness to act.
For New Zealand, the initial response was quick and clear: Prime Min-
ister Lange deplored the illegal seizure of power by the military; save for
the protection of New Zealand nationals, there would be no physical
intervention; all existing military training and some bilateral aid ties were
cut forthwith; and the constitutional authority of the governor-general-
such as it was-would remain the basis for New Zealand's dealings with
Fiji. Relishing the publicity and authority that these dramatic develop-
ments afforded him barely three months prior to a general election, Lange
then targeted Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara for strong criticism. Had Mara
wished to defuse the conditions that permitted the coup to hatch, Lange
claimed, then he had ample opportunity and standing to do so. By his
links with Rabuka, Mara had "allied himself with a person who purported
to dismiss the Governor General, to suspend the constitution and
announce they would have a new constitution which will be a republic if
necessary. You can't actually do much more than that" (NZH, 19 May
1987). Within days of the coup, the New Zealand government had sus-
pended Air New Zealand flights to Fiji, following the abortive hijacking
of one of its jumbo jets at Nadi airport, while warning tourists against
visiting the country. Like other countries in the region, New Zealand real-
ized that little progress could be expected, if any, until a scheduled meet-
ing of the South Pacific Forum at Apia, Western Samoa, was convened in
late May.
In contrast, the initial postcoup response from Australia was more hesi-
tant, partly because of Foreign Minister Hayden's refusal to permit Fiji's
turmoil to curtail his tour of European capitals. To the extent that some-
thing could be salvaged for the ousted Dr Bavadra, the possibility of inter-
vention was not entirely ruled out by Canberra in the first instance. Rela-
tively soon, however, the Australian government was expressing its
condemnation of the coup by cuts in aid, suspension of military assis-
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tance, and support for the governor-general's presumed attempts to effect
a constitutional settlement. Totally unacceptable to Australian Prime
Minister Bob Hawke was any possibility of the new regime being repre-
sented at the forthcoming Forum meeting; the choice between postpone-
ment and his personal boycott, should illegal Fijian representation occur
at the meeting, was privately conveyed by the Australian leader to his
counterparts in the region (Dominion, 28 May I987).
Because the coup represented a conspicuous news media event, some
friction was apparent between Lange and Hawke as to which of them
deserved to make most of the running on the issue. Hawke, for example,
was irked by Lange's "thoughts out loud" on the possibility of Australia-
New Zealand cooperation in transporting home a battalion of Fiji soldiers
serving with United Nations forces in the Sinai. Lange then failed to indi-
cate a common interest when Hawke announced the expulsion of the Lib-
yan Peoples Bureau from Canberra (Grant I987a). Following their con-
demnation of any suggestion that support be given to the possible use of
outside military intervention, which would "be contrary to international
law" (NZH, 2I May I987), both Australia and New Zealand were criti-
cized by leaders from Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and
Vanuatu for not using what they described as established procedures for
consultation within the region.
This response put paid to efforts being made by representatives of Dr
Bavadra's ousted government to have some kind of international peace-
keeping or investigative mission mounted for Fiji, a possibility that was
canvassed by a three-member group, consisting of Coalition Foreign Min-
ister Krishna Datt, Education Minister Dr Tupeni Baba, and Labour and
Immigration Minister Joeli Kalou, that visited Australia and New Zealand
shortly after the coup. Although these representatives gained considerable
public support with their call for firmer international action than any
immediately forthcoming, their leader, Dr Bavadra, was soon expressing
reservations about the continuing shifts of emphasis being made by Lange
and later Hawke (NZH, IO June I987).
Once it was apparent that Governor-General Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau
was far from being the neutral protector of Fiji's constitutional interests
that Australian and New Zealand official statements claimed, and once
Lange made it plain that Bavadra ought to join the governor-general's
council of ministers to help effect a political settlement, doubts intensified
within the ousted Coalition about whether New Zealand's condemnation
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of the coup was more hollow than real. Within barely a month of brand-
ing Ratu Mara a traitor, Lange was publicly applauding his "valiant
efforts" to reach a constitutional settlement (NZH, 9 June 1987). To some
degree, this sudden and unexpected show of faith in Mara was influenced
by Lange's belief that the efforts being made by some senior figures of the
New Zealand judiciary could bear results. Through their links as mem-
bers of the Fiji Court of Appeal, it was known that some senior New
Zealand judges had urged on Chief Justice Sir Timoci Tuivaga the neces-
sity to do all he could to persuade the governor-general of his responsibili-
ties to uphold the existing constitution, retain the rule of law, and main-
tain links with the Crown. As well, the New Zealand prime minister was
fully aware that, conservative and tradition-bound though it remained,
the Great Council of Chiefs was aware of these responsibilities and that,
between them, Mara and Ganilau could yet build support through that
body for a return to constitutional rule.
For both Australia and New Zealand, the broader necessity in the
immediate aftermath of the coup consisted not just of making some sense
of a confused constitutional situation, nor of curbing damage to national
property, personnel, or even aid projects. It entailed holding to a line of at
least tolerable regional political cohesion pending the forthcoming heads
of government meeting of the South Pacific Forum. Limitation of damage
was the highest priority; any steps the Forum might take in support of a
return to constitutional rule in Fiji would be a bonus. Ironically, while Fiji
did not appear as a formal agenda item in the planned deliberations of the
Forum, a heading that was duly discussed was: Information Exchange on
International Developments Affecting the Security of the Region (SPF
1987a).
THE MAY 1987 SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM
On the subject of Fiji, the Forum meeting issued a general statement that
expressed "deep concern and anguish ... at the overthrow of the elected
government in Fiji" but "recognising the complexity of the problems"
expressed hopes "for a peaceful and satisfactory solution to the current
problems" (SPF 1987a, para 5). An attempt was made to have Ganilau
accept a three-member mission headed by Australian Prime Minister
Hawke, Prime Minister Ezekiel Alebua of the Solomons, and Director
Henry Naisali of the Forum's key servicing agency (SPEC). They would
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING 1990
visit Suva if requested and "hold discussions with all parties in Fiji with a
view to attempting to facilitate processes leading to a resolution of current
problems" (SPF 1987b, para 5).
However well intentioned (and that is open to some question), this ini-
tiative proved a minor diplomatic disaster. Friction arose between Hawke
and Prime Minister Paias Wingti of Papua New Guinea as to how the mes-
sage either was or should have been conveyed to Suva. For other observ-
ers, the refusal of the governor-general to accept such a mission became a
virtual certainty once it was clear Hawke would lead the mission, because
this was seen as reawakening suspicions about the dominant power in the
region wielding undue influence. That such a perception existed among a
number of South Pacific Forum governments was perhaps less surprising
than the alacrity with which it was expressed. At any rate, the newly
installed interim council of ministers in Fiji, including both Ratu Mara
and coup leader Rabuka, had little cause for apprehension about any
regional pressures that would force them to abandon their increasingly
dominant objective: the legitimating of Fijian political paramountcy
through a new constitution.
Hence by August 1987, the outlines of the Great Council of Chiefs' plan
for a single-chamber legislature numerically dominated by Fijians were
being publicized, as were the reservation of key political offices for Fijians
and the exclusive use of communal representation. Equally significant
were doubts, about whether the regime would leave the Commonwealth
and become a republic, that gave Australian and New Zealand officials an
opportunity to exercise some influence on the deliberations that occurred
prior to the second coup.
Departure from the Commonwealth, such officials would have warned
the interim council, represented a real cost for Fiji that could involve a loss
of useful intergovernmental political, economic, and functional contacts,
reduced aid, and fewer opportunities for highly popular sporting ex-
changes. More significant than these, however, was the emotional and
psychological wrench that a rupture of allegiance to the Crown and the
Queen would unavoidably represent for ordinary Fijians, who customar-
ily identified such sentiments with loyalty to Fiji, its land, way of life, and
chiefly structure of authority. (It was no accident that the original date of
independence, 10 October 1970, was chosen to coincide with exactly 96
years of formal British rule since the Deed of Cession). Another consider-
ation was the extent to which Ratu Mara, a knight of the realm, could be
persuaded to accept that his place in the history of his country would be
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less sullied were he to accept the need for a constitutional arrangement
that allowed for a fairer ethnic balance in the legislature than that recom-
mended by the Great Council of Chiefs.
In a letter to Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau in July 1987, Prime Minister
Lange indicated that should the proposed solution "be one that is discrimi-
natory and undemocratic in ways which are unacceptable to significant
sections of the people of the country, it will be hard to see international
relations with Fiji return to normality."l To the extent that Fiji sustained
economic damage following the May coup, including a decline in tourism,
falling sugar production following industrial disruption, growing infla-
tion, and unemployment, as well as the longer-term worries flowing from
out-migration of skilled and professional workers, the incentives to make
real concessions in favor of a return to constitutional rule were tangible
enough.
For Prime Minister Hawke, the intercoup period was one in which an
attempt was made to influence Fiji toward the path of constitutional
respectability. Although Canberra permitted the appointment of a Fijian
high commissioner to Australia in July, it was maintained that this implied
no recognition of the coup. In a letter to the governor-general at that time,
Hawke indicated support for his efforts to "try and secure a proper out-
come" (NZH, 15 July 1987). While Hawke acknowledged that Australia
was unpopular in some quarters in Fiji, goodwill was manifest in the lift-
ing of the trade union ban against cargo going to Fiji, and through the
arrival of the new high commissioner. Future levels of aid would remain
under review. In response the governor-general outlined what he believed
were measures to return Fiji to normalcy, welcomed the lifting of the
union ban, but expressed serious concern about the future loss of aid
(ibid).
To the extent that they were public, the attempts by Australia and New
Zealand, taken individually but often following joint consultation, repre-
sented the major regional effort to influence the interim council regime
during the intercoup period. Nothing further was heard of a Papua New
Guinea proposal, initially made just prior to the May Forum heads of gov-
ernment meeting in Apia, for a conference to solve the constitutional crisis
in Fiji. To the extent that any outside contact could be made with the
regime, Papua New Guinea favored either informal or lower level
approaches (PIM, Aug 1987, 9).
Only in Australia or New Zealand could it be said that any kind of con-
stituency existed for either the ousted Bavadra Coalition government or
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the Indian community in Fiji. Through the news media, some individuals
attacked what they regarded as pusillanimity by Australia or New
Zealand for insufficient support of Bavadra. And via public meetings
hosted for representatives of the ousted government, or through trade
union bans and denunciations of the military-backed regime, governments
in Wellington and Canberra were well aware that their respective Fiji poli-
cies were being critically followed by interested groups and members of
the public. Among the goals of bodies such as the Wellington-based Coali-
tion for Democracy in Fiji was representation at public, governmental,
and international levels for the "demilitarisation of political power and an
early return to civilian rule under a democratic Constitution accepted and
supported by all of Fiji's multiracial communities; public and financial
support for the accomplishment of these ends; a continuous monitoring of
the situation in Fiji"; and support for the "rights of indigenous Fijians to
self determination and development of their land, culture, identity, reli-
gious beliefs and other resources, to the extent these are consistent with
Fiji's legal and moral obligations to the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights 1948" (Sunrise 1988).
The regime in Suva retaliated by a variety of means, helped less by any
outright defense from South Pacific governments, including Tonga, the
Cook Islands, and Papua New Guinea, than by their spirited attack on
"outsiders" told they would do well to attend to their own domestic prob-
lems before urging Fiji's return to constitutional rule. Such statements
implied that neither Australia nor New Zealand was in a position to urge
a return to civil and political rights in Fiji while they themselves held dis-
contented and dispossessed autochthonous Aboriginal and Maori peo-
ples. Rabuka showed less interest in ascribing motives of neocolonialism
or selective ethnic bias by Australia and New Zealand than in complaining
that outsiders did not understand his situation (Rabuka 1987). Either way,
such criticisms gave little attention to whether the interests of all races in
Fiji might be better promoted or safeguarded under conditions of civil
rule, rights under law, or peaceful political change.
THE SECOND MILITARY Coup
When Colonel Rabuka's impatience with the political discussions leading
to an accord at Deuba finally snapped, precipitating his second coup, the
response from Australia and New Zealand was one of dismay. Following
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Rabuka's rescinding of the 1970 constitution, declaration of republican
status, and withdrawal from the Commonwealth, New Zealand further
reduced its aid program, curtailed concessions available to Fiji sugar
exporters, and recalled its high commissioner. These steps were greeted
with consternation by numerous Fijians, but Rabuka could claim his
country was far from isolated on the international stage. At the Vancouver
Commonwealth heads of government meeting in October, where Fiji was
a key issue, none other than British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
observed archly that at least four members of the existing Commonwealth
were military regimes, many others had republican status, and Fiji did not
deserve isolation, much less expulsion (Dominion, 17 Oct 1987).
The second, coup, however, constitutionally more decisive in outcome
than its predecessor, served to highlight what had become an increasingly
narrow, if not precarious, policy approach by Australia and New
Zealand. Having backed the governor-general solidly in the hope that he
could use the status of his office to encourage a return to genuine constitu-
tional rule, they were now acutely embarrassed at his acceptance of office
as president of the new republican regime. One reason they had supported
keeping the governor-general at the apex of the customary Fijian order
was their belief that the most senior chiefs, because of their status and loy-
alty to the Crown, would be able to rein in Rabuka before he bolted from
the Commonwealth. Even shortly after the second coup, New Zealand
Foreign Minister Russell Marshall was speaking of "a beginning of a
stacking up of Fijian chiefs in opposition to the line Rabuka has taken"
(NZH, 30 Sept 1987). Another view was that the second coup had simply
exposed Australian and New Zealand policy for what it was-a de facto
willingness to work with the new regime. More forcefully for one New
Zealand-based observer, Ramesh Thakur, British, Australian, and New
Zealand support for the role of the governor-general in the intercoup
period had served simply to endorse Rabuka's aims: "The de facto posi-
tion of Colonel Rabuka as the military strong man of Fiji was legitimised
by the governor general and the latter's actions received royal assent"
(Thakur 1988).
Shortly after the second coup, but just prior to the Vancouver Com-
monwealth heads of government meeting, Prime Minister Hawke claimed
to journalists that "I don't think any of us, including it seems Dr Bavadra,
can realistically expect that there is going to be a constitutional parliamen-
tary system which doesn't involve some greater in-built protection for the
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Fijians" (Grant 1987b). These remarks were promptly seized upon by
Rabuka as evidence that Hawke had "endorsed the need for changes to
Fiji's constitution to give greater protection to Fijians" (ibid). By contrast,
Dr Bavadra's reaction was one of contempt: "Mr Hawke must first decide
whether he stands for the basic principles of representative democracy and
the free expression of the will of the people or whether he has reconciled
to the philosophy that all power stems fr,om the barrel of a gun" (ibid).
During October 1987, arguably the most arbitrary and chaotic phase of
Fiji's year of turmoil, when taukei-ism was at its most pronounced within
the government, influence over events by either Australia or New Zealand
was marginal. With the return of something resembling civilian govern-
ment under the "interim" administration led by Ratu Mara in December,
some opportunities had already become evident. In November, a repre-
sentative of the Fiji regime, Filipe Bole, visited both Australia and New
Zealand with the purpose of commencing a dialogue. After meeting minis-
ters in both capitals, Bole believed he had achieved that objective (Press,
20 Nov 1987).
Two months later, in Fiji on a private visit, New Zealand Cabinet Min-
ister Richard Prebble used contacts available through his wife, a native-
born Fijian with connections to senior levels of die regime. (The late Ratu
David Toganivalu, former Deputy Prime Minister to Ratu Mara, was Mrs·
Prebble's cousin.) On his return to New Zealand, Prebble said that the
draft constitution under study in Fiji was a tolerable one, and that steps
should be taken to further links (Dominion, 29 Jan 1988). He briefed his
cabinet colleagues accordingly. The same month saw a resumption of
Australian aid to Fiji, a great disappointment to a representative of the
deposed Bavadra Coalition, Dr Tupeni Baba, who said he expected better
from the government of a party with principles similar to those of the Fiji
Labour Party (EP, 25 Jan 1988). New Zealand simultaneously resumed aid
to Fiji, but not at precoup levels.
GETTING BACK TO "NORMAL"
As if keen to convince themselves as much as anyone else, governments in
the Pacific adopted policies toward the regime in Fiji during 1988 thatsig-
nified passage of time was itself a normalizing factor regarding the need to
deal officially with Suva. That Ratu Mara's interim government had a
constitutional plan "under review," at least ostensibly open to public
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response in Fiji, allowed the Forum governments to maintain that formal
links were being patiently withheld pending the outcome.
Within that scarcely onerous constraint, de facto diplomatic recogni-
tion did increase. Reasons given included claims that a continued curb on
civilian aid would do more to harm the interests of the Fiji population at
large than hinder the legitimacy of the regime; that recognition was more
a matter of acknowledging the reality of sovereign states than of dealing
with their governments; that if the region was ready to begin interacting
with Fiji on a more open basis, then who were Australia or New Zealand
to impede such a development; and that if moves were not made to draw
Fiji back into the Forum club, then Suva would be open to the increasing
enticements of French aid and support-which was anathema to Melane-
sian governments given their hostility to French policy on New Caledonia.
Given these currents, it was no surprise that Ratu Mara wrote to the
prime minister of Western Samoa, then the chairman of the South Pacific
Forum, asking for help in "building ... bridges of understanding" (Bar-
ber 1988). Formal links were established between Australia and Fiji in
March 1988 with the appointment of an Australian ambassador to Suva.
New Zealand followed suit. For Australia, this move was "based on the
Government's perception that the interim civilian Government in Fiji was
firmly in control and that the establishment of that Government was a
step in the direction of the re-establishment of democratic parliamentary
government" (ADFA 1988).
A month later, New Zealand's returning ambassador from Suva, Mr
Rodney Gates, said Fiji had to find its own solution to its ethnic and con-
stitutional difficulties-a process that could not be speeded and in which
"we shouldn't take actions which damage their economy ... since any
economic downturn would introduce new stresses in the community and
compound the constitutional difficulties they do have" (EP, 12 Apr 1988).
At that time Ratu Mara was in London visiting Buckingham Palace
where, with the Queen's private secretary, he unsurprisingly failed to
restore his country's links with the Crown and the Commonwealth. Nev-
ertheless he was welcomed to Downing Street in a visit to Mrs Thatcher
that did little to harm the interim government's quest for international
acceptance.
The early months of 1988 signified a quickening acceptance of the need
of other governments to begin dealing more openly with the regime in Fiji.
In January, Ratu Mara told leaders of the fourteen Forum governments
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concerned that Fiji was making positive progress toward a constitution
that would return it to parliamentary democracy. However, his letter also
indicated that this constitutional framework would ensure "the full pro-
tection of the fundamental interests of the indigenous Fijians" (EP, 23 Jan
1988). Soon afterward, Nauru opened relations with Suva, and a similar
step was taken by the Cook Islands.
In June 1988, the interim government introduced draconian curbs on
basic liberties in Fiji, not just to stifle dissent and trade union opposition,
but to deter those the regime believed were planning its overthrow. This
action was directly linked to seizures in Sydney and Fiji of arms that, it
was claimed, were intended for deliberate destabilization of the country.
At that time, political violence was disrupting neighboring New Caledo-
nia, and the Mara government used both developments to claim that
tough internal security measures were justified. To the consternation of
Foreign Minister Marshall, New Zealand Prime Minister Lange de-
nounced the internal decrees as Rabuka's third coup. The measures were
subsequently relaxed following adverse international reaction, but they
did little to impede a trend toward increasing diplomatic, if not political,
acceptance of Fiji by its regional neighbors.
Although diminished in status, Ratu Mara was able to attend the Sep-
tember 1988 heads of government meeting of the South Pacific Forum and
insist that internal political and constitutional developments in Fiji not
come under discussion. Here he was helped by the Tongan government,
which made a point of obstructing attempts by Dr Bavadra's representa-
tive, Mr Jone Dakuvula, to gain-access to officials. For New Zealand Dep-
uty Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer, having Fiji on the agenda would have
retarded efforts to strengthen long-term regional cooperation among the
Forum countries: "The idea that the very difficult political issues involving
the internal self-government of one country, and the nature of the consti-
tution in that country, can be determined by an organisation of this sort is
I am afraid unrealistic" (Radio Australia 1988).2
Nevertheless at this meeting both Palmer and Hawke held individual
meetings with Ratu Mara, where they expressed concern at a military ele-
ment being promised a continuing and permanent role in the government
under the proposed constitution. Hawke, whose meeting with Ratu Mara
was facilitated by Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Michael Somare,
insisted that his foreign minister, Senator Evans, visit Dr Bavadra. Failure
to allow such access would mean cancellation of a promised increase of
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Australian aid from A$I2 million to A$22 million. Although Hawke ack-
nowledged that relations between Australia and Fiji were necessarily
damaged by the 1987 coups, his foreign minister emphasized caution. Aus-
tralia's scope for influence was limited, the matter was essentially internal
to Fiji, and while future aid levels would be influenced by the Suva
regime's performance on human rights, "at the end of the day we hope
that it will be the case that a broadly acceptable constitution is achieved in
Fiji. [A restoration of] something like democratic normality even if it is
not as satisfactory a basis as existed in the past" would be acceptable
(Radio Australia 1988).
CQnsidering this approach along with the attitude of a number of the
Polynesian governments attending the 1988 Forum meeting-essentially a
position that assumed the difficulty ofFiji would resolve itself given time
and noninterference-the implied messages to the Mara regime were as
dear as could have been wished. In essence, first the internal situation in
Fiji continues to unsettle and potentially destabilize existing systems and
codes of regional cooperation; second, our concern will not be openly
aired at the South Pacific Forum, both to spare us embarrassment about
what to do, and also to prevent you from claiming unwarranted interfer-
ence; third, provided you produce a constitution that at least nods toward
an acknowledgment of the rule of law, guaranteed civil rights, and the
opportunity for constitutional change between governments not contain-
ing an overt military presence, the door will be open, after a suitable
period, to allow your return to our club under conditions resembling nor-
malcy.
A number of factors would have favored such an approach. First, for
Australia and New Zealand, was the recognition that within most of their
small South Pacific Forum partner states, the attitudes and positions of
individual heads of government were critical on the question of Fiji.
Whether through officials or other channels, little scope existed in such
small states for the presentation of options very different from the per-
sonal preferences of the leader in power. It would be wrong to assume that
Pacific Island leaders automatically sided with the Fijian chiefly order, but
it could not be said that any were willing to go against its interests-at
least to the extent of endorsing Dr Bavadra's ousted Coalition govern-
ment. Further, there was an appreciation that these leaders, reluctant to
condemn the coups, and certainly opposed to mobilizing against them,
were the people whose trust and cooperation would be required in future
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dealings; this indicated the longer-term interests of both Australia and
New Zealand in the region.
Second was the awkward question of precedent, in which Australia and
New Zealand faced a dilemma. Each had variously promoted the concept
of a ready reaction force capable of interceding at short notice under con-
ditions of internal instability within the region; the concept had now faced
an acid test and been found wanting. If both governments had decided
against the use of force following the first Fiji coup, for whatever reasons,
what then of any future contingency? Could it not be argued that then,
too, unique circumstances would provide ready arguments against the use
of some quick and decisive intrusion? Could not such circumstances pro-
vide equally, if not more, compelling arguments against using force?
For the sake of their countries' international and domestic appearances,
Canberra and Wellington could well have decided that a sufficiently
robust verbal protest to the interim regime was required, yet not so robust
that they could be open to charges of unwarranted interference. And
where would such a charge arise? Primarily, it seems, from the increas-
ingly vociferous ethnic lobbies in both Australia and New Zealand, keen
for ideological reasons to denounce their governments for acts of latter-
day colonialism in the Pacific.
Certainly New Zealand Foreign Minister Marshall, who assumed that
post after his party's August 1987 return to office, was sensitive to such
charges: "Whatever our Western constitutional anxieties might be, we
have to be careful [that] what we do does not make us sound white, guilty,
patronising, and having a neo-colonialist attitude" (EP, 12 Aug 1988).
Some opinion leaders in the Maori community, such as Ranginui Walker,
condemned Rabuka and his coups, but other Maoris supported the over-
throw, something the New Zealand government believed it could not
ignore. Nor were representatives of the postcoup regime in Fiji loath to
use the opportunities for leverage that this sensitivity presented. For the
regime's propagandist, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, the "efforts of the Fijian
people to share their heritage with others have been both ignored and
spurned in the desire to extend foreign hegemony over an indigenous peo-
ple. The indigenous Fijians have no desire to suffer the fate of other indig-
enous people in certain obvious Pacific countries" (Press, 5Jan 1989).
For Papua New Guinea's former prime minister, Michael Somare, the
problem in Fiji was not "caused by Fijians. The problem is that they have
a multiracial community and sometimes one has to feel that way about
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Melanesian or Polynesian groups being the minority in their own country.
I think you see the same thing in New Caledonia where the indigenous
people form the minority. There is a racial, ethnic group in Fiji who were
not there because of their own making but because of other people's mak-
ing. They happen to be in an island community and they are ahead of the
Melanesian Fijians" (IB, Dec 1988, 26).
A third, and perhaps more significant factor permitting the postcoup
regime the benefit of the doubt over its intentions to return to civilian rule,
involved wider foreign policy interests. Here, there were separate, if·
linked, rationales concerning the South Pacific. The first concerned the
future well-being of the South Pacific Forum, which was under increasing
pressure to strengthen its capacity for institutional, servicing, and policy
implementation. The 1987 coups could not have happened at a worse time
for the initiation of such changes. Not only were the facilities located in
Suva, but the cooperation of the host government was imperative for any
proposed strengthening of the organization to succeed. As key supporters
and funding sources for the South Pacific Forum, not to mention related
regional institutions such as the Forum Fisheries Agency, the University of
the South Pacific, and a variety of multilateral aid activities, Australia and
New Zealand were understandably loath to see a past and continuing
commitment of resources jeopardized by a Fiji left sulking in repressive
isolation.
More broadly, and this would relate specifically to New Zealand, there
was the concern that a broken Fiji would mean not just a fractured region,
but a diminution of New Zealand's capacity to act as its interpreter to the
wider world. A regime in Suva that was palpably hostile to New Zealand
might waste little time in conveying that attitude to other governments in
the region, thus degrading the quality of cooperation, information, and
access needed by New Zealand to play the role of medium. This role
assumed increased importance for New Zealand as the South Pacific
assumed greater international prominence, as well as permitting Wel-
lington the opportunity for access to important capitals at a time when its
antinuclear policy was closing doors.
It was perhaps no accident that at the 1988 meeting of the South Pacific
Forum, where the internal situation in Fiji was studiously avoided, an ini-
tiative for what was termed a post-Forum dialogue was launched. This
would involve invitations to selected outside powers, such as Japan, the
United States, or Canada, and agencies such as the Asian Development
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Bank, to confer with Forum representatives following each annual heads
of government meeting (SPF I988).
Such an approach acknowledged the necessity to maintain viable struc-
tures of intergovernmental cooperation under conditions where the Pacific
Islands were vulnerable to the interests, even depredations, of outside
interests. These interests included fishing where, after attenuated negotia-
tions, an agreement had been reached between Pacific Island fisheries
interests and the United States, as well as trade, investment, nuclear waste
dumping, and development assistance. Such unity as the region could
muster, it was argued, was essential under conditions where stronger out-
side interests could see advantage in having it divided and weakened.
Politically, such attempts could come from France, already at odds with
Australia and New Zealand over decolonization policy in New Caledonia
and unabated underground nuclear testing at Moruroa; from Japan or
Taiwan over fishing access; or from either superpower for the purposes of
denying security to the dominant rival. Indeed in June I989, France struck
a deal with Fiji to build a naval base at Suva, bringing the charge of
"cheque book diplomacy" from Lange.
From these considerations, it is not difficult to identify a pattern of
response to the Fiji coups consonant with the pragmatic, conventional for-
eign policy practice of most states. The pursuit of wider values such as the
defence of human rights was clearly secondary for Australia and New
Zealand. Uppermost had to remain the retention of existing policies of
furthering regional objectives through existing institutions, elites, and
policies. For different reasons, both Australia and New Zealand· were
keen not to follow policies toward a postcoup Fiji that would jeopardize
their relations with the United States. Though not a major domestic factor
in the election of Bavadra's Coalition in I987, the knowledge that the Coa-
lition's intentions to have Fiji return to its previous policy of banning
nuclear ship visits was unwelcome to Washington was widely appreciated
by officials in Canberra and Wellington.
These responses indicated a preference, by Australia and New Zealand,
to revert to the habits and practices of established national interest diplo-
macy. No longer unique, the Pacific was now just another arena of exter-
nal relations in which the use of force, calculations of immediate state
interest, and the uses of security intelligence provided an immediate back-
drop for assessment.
Within the South Pacific Forum, member states in their diplomatic and
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political appraisals of postcoup Fiji adopted a policy that could be identi-
fied as "damage control." Rarely a shout, sometimes barely a murmur, but
most usually through a mutter, governments went on public record as dis-
approving Rabuka's action, urging a return to constitutional government
permitting peaceful change via the ballot box, and at the same time
forswearing actions that could be construed as unwarranted outside inter-
ference in Fiji's internal affairs. Attitudes among Pacific elites regarding
challenges to their authority by so-called "outsiders," a degree of anti-
Asian prejudice that cannot be ignored in the Pacific Islands, and concern
with keeping existing systems of commitment to regional cooperation
were all pertinent factors.
Yet when the focus shifts to the impact of the coups on the more mate-
rial, as distinct from declaratory or identifiably public, postures adopted
by governments in the region some interesting contradictions begin to
appear. In the immediate aftermath of the coups, the Fiji economy faced
contraction, decline in export earnings, and serious loss of skills through
the out-migration of citizens of Indian ethnicity. Although relatively brief
in duration, trade union bans organized from Australia and New Zealand
in response to the first coup also aggravated Fiji's economic situation.
In turn, the interim regime headed by Ratu Mara initiated what it
claimed were innovative policies designed to ensure the long-term pros-
.perity of Fiji. The showpiece was the tax-free zone established in Fiji late
in I987. By any reckoning, after only a year in e:x;istence the scheme had
made remarkable progress. Over F$Ioo millions in foreign exchange had
been earned, with a thirteen-year tax holiday granted to 37 foreign-owned
companies, of which 27 came from Australia and New Zealand (NZH, 24
Jan I989). This climate of deregulation was at odds with a precoup struc-
ture of heavily subsidized regulation that had benefited the state sector
and local business, but disadvantaged the young, the poor, and those
without connections. A representative of the interim regime, trade secre-
tary Navitilai Naisoro, claimed that "when employment and production
in the export sector exceed that of the domestic sector by a big margin, it
won't make sense to protect the domestic sector any longer." However, he
went on to claim that it "made no sense for investors in New Zealand and
Australia to continue operating in those countries when we have such an
attractive investment package to offer" (EP, 20 Jan I988).
In the drive for enhanced foreign exchange earnings, the postcoup
order was assisted by two devaluations reducing Fiji's currency by a third
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of its previous value, by a substantial clamp on trade union activities
through its security decrees, and by already existing arrangements to land
goods bn the Australian and New Zealand markets free of dutY under the
aegis of the South Pacific Agreement on Trade and Technical Economic
Cooperation (SPARTECA). The opportunities created for foreign invest-
ment in Fiji saw a boost to the garment industry, where cheap labor was
exploited, but incensed New Zealand union interests because of the duty-
free access allowed to Fiji-made goods on the New Zealand market (EP, 5
Apr I988).
By the end of I988, New Zealand had resumed most of its previous
NZ$5 million aid program to Fiji, while Australia had increased its alloca-
tion from A$I2 million to A$I6.8 million, with a further A$5.2 million
promised following review in I989. As well, Fiji was receiving aid from
France, Japan, and the European Community. Multilateral assistance was
forthcoming from the World Bank which had been a regular contributor
to Fiji's development programs since I970, and in I987 provided a major
loan of US$23.4 million for road development (PR, 3 Mar I989). Fiji was
also beginning to receive funding from the Japanese Shipbuilding Sasa-
kawa Foundation, ostensibly for scholarships at the University of the
South Pacific (SSD, 20 Jan I989). In addition, links between local and
regional business interests were being established, such as the New
Zealand-Fiji Business Council, which was designed to foster not just
investment and market opportunities, but also New Zealand government
assistance.
By October I988, Fiji's foreign exchange stood at a healthy level of
F$306 million-the equivalent of seven months of import expenditure. Yet
this figure masked some disturbing features of the Fijian economy: there
had been a serious decline in capital imports which, added to the severe
loss of skills, signaled weak prospects for domestically generated growth
outside that provided by traditional earners such as sugar, tourism, fish-
ing, and gold. It was not difficult, therefore, to characterize the Fiji econ-
omy as one of reinforcing dependencies, where the country was increas-
_ingly vulnerable and sensitive to trade and investment fluctuations, where
its earnings remained in the unprocessed commodity sector, and where
these realities served to perpetuate existing internal divisions, whether
based on wealth, race, or regional allegiance.
So far as the wider regional impact was concerned, in particular the
effect of relevant Australian and New Zealand policies and economic
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practices, little was done that could be regarded as assisting Fiji toward
greater economic autonomy. Something of a dual paradox became
increasingly evident: Fiji's postcoup regime articulated a rhetoric of
heightened independence within the region, yet took actions that further
cemented its domestic and international economic structures within an
edifice of dependency; the region articulated a rhetoric of allowing Fiji to
find its own path back to "normalcy," yet took actions that, unwittingly or
not, ensured the postcoup regime would remain locked in dependency on
international capital, skills, and trade access.
Whether through leaving the Commonwealth and becoming a republic,
courting economic or military assistance from France, Israel, Taiwan, or
Indonesia, or offering continued service in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, Fiji following its coups was unmistakably more dependent,
vulnerable, and even supplicatory. Public utterances to the contrary, the
regime's earnings growth coupled with infrastructural decay, its employ-
ment of poorly paid and semiskilled workers amidst a flight of profession-
als, and its official veneration of traditional village livelihood practices
together with an obsequious enlistment of foreign money further high-
lighted the paradox.
CONCLUSIONS
Just two years since the first of Fiji's military coups, what can be usefully
adduced regarding their regional impact? For a variety of reasons, other
Pacific nations were predisposed to accept Rabuka's coups as faits accom-
plis. Although they were certainly more than token, such forms of support
for the luckless Dr Bavadra as existed in the region were overshadowed by
what were considered more important realities, including a concern not to
be seen as unduly interfering in Fiji's internal affairs. Such interference
would, it was perceived, as likely generate problems as solve them and
would also create unwanted precedents for future intervention in the
internal politics of small Pacific states by possibly well-meaning, but prob-
ably bigger states.
Linked to these concerns was the oft-stated claim that Fiji should be left
to sort out its own constitutional and political solutions. That it had been
left alone during both the orderly conduct of a General Election in April
I987, which precipitated the first coup a month later, and then during the
Deuba Accord of September I987, which immediately precipitated the sec-
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ond, were facts that went largely ignored. Assumptions conveyed by the
"leave Fiji to solve it own problems" approach, were beliefs about its even-
tual return to "reasonableness," the incentives that existed for its full
return to regional cooperation, and its self-interest in wanting a viable
economy based on the rule of law and peaceful political change.
Any statements deploring the coups made by governments in the region
remained secondary to a greater perceived need to retain a viable fabric of
regional cooperation, acknowledging Fiji's central physical and functional
location. Stated negatively, had the postcoup regimes been of a mind to do
so, they could have seriously damaged existing and future Pacific regional
linkages. Whether for future cooperation in negotiating fishing arrange-
ments with external operators, for the future of the Pacific Forum Line, or
for strengthening the institutional fabric of the South Pacific Forum itself,
a region divided was seen as a region vulnerable. These beliefs were con-
firmed less by the formation of the so-called Melanesian Spearhead group
than by the attempts made by France to enlist the support of Polynesian
elites with blandishments of aid, recognition of status, or efforts to deflect
opposition to French nuclear testing and a troubled record of decoloniza-
tion in New Caledonia (Richardson 1988).
The wider political order of the region was heavily shaken by the Fiji
military coups. Without resulting in direct emulation, they nevertheless
encouraged the active threat of force, physical confrontation, and a delib-
erate buckling of civilian institutions by noncompliance, obstruction, and
harassment. This was an acceleration in the politics of brinkmanship sub-
sequently witnessed in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea.
For Australia and New Zealand, the Fiji coups underlined misgivings
about using force in the region. Although the capability existed, and 1988
disturbances in Vanuatu saw that country's leader seriously considering
the feasibility of a police presence from Australia, New Zealand, or Papua
New Guinea, the impact of events in Fiji pushed that possibility toward
the bottom of the list of options. Formerly in a close military training rela-
tionship with Fiji, New Zealand, following the rupture caused by the
coups, began conducting training and exercises in the wider region. Both
Australia and New Zealand learned difficult lessons about the need for
better local political intelligence regarding internal developments in Fiji.
Both countries used the ambiguities of the governor-general's constitu-
tional position following the first coup to try to facilitate a return to civil-
ian rule without being seen as directly interfering.
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Although of some significance, the steps taken by Australia and New
Zealand in retaliation against Rabuka were calculated as being only that.
To do less could be seen as implicitly condoning the use of force; to do
more, an incitement for the rogue element in Fiji to run further amok, not
just within the country, but by wrecking painfully constructed diplomatic
structures in the wider region as well. If that involved a compromise in
both purpose and execution in their handling of Rabuka's Fiji, then this
was judged the least unpalatable option.
Notes
I The letter was dated 8 July 1987 and sent prior to a Great Council of Chiefs
meeting known to favor endorsement of the exclusive use of communal methods
of representation in Fiji (Auckland Star, 23 July 1987).
2 Palmer, who attended the Forum meeting, subsequently confirmed that the
Melanesian states and, particularly, Tonga lobbied to keep Fiji off the Forum
agenda. Members of the Forum Secretariat had also opposed raising the subject
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